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## VALUE AND NORMATIVITY IN CULTURAL GROUNDS OF SUBJECTIVITY

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### Abstract

**The relevance of this study.** The analysis of the problem of subjectivity in the context of the dialectics of value and normativity is one of the fundamental ones in contemporary philosophical discourse. The neo-Kantian transcendental method is effective in research of difference of subjectivity and consciousness as different modes of personification of ideals and values of culture. The dialectics of the concepts of pluralistic empirical experience and the hierarchy of meaningful activity in the context of the uniqueness of subjectivity and objectification of consciousness is an important tack for a contemporary humanitarian study. **The purpose of the study** is to determine the influence of value and normativity in the process of subjectivity's becoming. **The objective of the study is:** by the example of neo-Kantian philosophy to reveal the statement about the significance of value as a normative foundation of existence, which gives it the character of transcending. **The result of the study.** Nature, by definition of the Neo-Kantian philosophy, is the material from which and in which culture implements transcendental meanings. The product of the realization of epistemological inquiries, knowledge as the foundation of subjectivity, is the embodiment of normativity, legitimized by the transcendental nature of value. Value as normativity through the explication of the potential of culture organizes the chaotic world of empirical given into a hierarchical structure of the space of human being. The culture's deterministic marking of the embodied world is the key and the basis of the unity and stability of subjectivity, its self-identity and uniqueness in the universal field of cultural values and the diversity of empirical experience. Culture as a horizon of established patterns of interaction between human and the world changes not so much the surrounding reality as the content and the predicaments of subjectivity. And in this vein, it becomes necessary to justify the definition of subjectivity as a memory of experience. It is in this interpretation that theory and practice, value and norm, the ideal and the objectivity of human being are harmonized in the uniqueness of existence. **The practical value of the study:** is stimulating scientific discussions about the links between value and normativity as essence grounds of subjectivity in philosophy of culture, is expanding the possibilities of interpretation the subjectivity's phenomena.

**Keywords:** subjectivity, value, normativity, culture, transcendental analysis method.

### *Problem statement in general and its connection with important scientific or practical tasks*

Traditionally, the founders of the philosophy of culture are either the

philosophy of life or the philosophy of neo-Kantianism. Representatives of both the Baden and Marburg schools paid considerable attention to considerations about the essence of

culture. It is important that the followers of I. Kant put into question the laws of human interaction with the world in the focus of their philosophical analytics. It is advisable to design the diversity of this interaction as a measure of value-based requests and actions. It is logical to assume that values are the phenomenon that causes the formation or consciousness of a certain configuration and content. After all, culture as a horizon and a ground for the formation of subjectivity determines the necessary and sufficient spectrum for self-identification and realization of its activity. The postmodern discourse against the ontology of value is striking in its procedural rather than productive. Obviously, the idea of values changes, not the belief in the necessity of their existence. And it is also obvious that the content of values legitimized by society determines subjectivity in the basic features of detection and activity. Therefore, the question of the nature or metaphysics of value in relation to cognitive procedures is urgent.

***Analysis of recent research and publications, which initiated the solution of this problem, on which the authors rely***

The method of transcendental analysis of subjectivity with regard to the interpretation of the essence of culture allows us to establish general constructs of perception, definition and evaluation of reality. Guido Kreis (2019) argues that transcendental analysis is indeed a legitimate model of interpretation for understanding Kant's philosophy and his followers.

The author proceeds from an understanding of the versatility and the need to determine the content of knowledge about the world: "A cognition is a priori if it is both 'strictly universal' and 'necessary'. It is strictly universal if it holds of all instances of experience and for all cognizing subjects without exception; it is necessary if it is impossible that any instance of experience does not contain the element in question. The point is that only a transcendental analysis, i.e. a non-empirical theory of the a priori conditions of experience, is able to account for the methodologically necessary presuppositions of science." [14, 6] Accordingly, the transcendental analysis of subjectivity is based on the principles of universal and culture-determined communication of evaluative judgments about the world: "The fundamental relation that holds between the a priori conditions and the factum of experience is that of (i) a constitution of objects through categories in terms of objective validity: the application of the basic norms of experience constitutes the objectivity of experience. Transcendental analysis in turn (ii) determines the content of the a priori conditions through analysis of their manifestations. Moreover, it (iii) illuminates the connections between the a priori conditions by reconstructing their systematic network. This is in effect (iv) an explanation of the implicit ground structure of our experience, which we tacitly master in the different spheres of culture, science, and everyday discourse. Finally, it (v) significantly

contributes to the self-reflective understanding of ourselves, and our relation to the world.” [14, 19] In relation to the problem of value, the question of normativity arises in an epistemological and socio-cultural perspective.

Frederick C. Beiser (2009) analyzes the notion of normativity as a problematic concept of modern philosophy. The author finds the origins of this problematization in the philosophy of neo-Kantianism, especially in connection with the problem of philosophical substantiation of the phenomenon of value. The researcher considers the concept of normativity significant for the modern philosophical discourse, and the author sees the origins of such ideological disorientation in the problematization of normativity in neo-Kantianism: “Rickert advances several arguments – all of them familiar from the idealist tradition – for why the unity of value and fact transcends conceptual formulation. First, this unity is prior to all conceiving, explaining or demonstrating, because it is a necessary condition for these activities; because any attempt to conceive, explain or demonstrate it presupposes it, it eludes conception, explanation and demonstration itself. Second, our intellect is essentially analytical, understanding things by taking them apart into independent terms; it therefore grasps the indivisible only by dividing it, i.e., it cannot understand the indivisible at all. Third, the intellect also proceeds ‘heterologically’, as Rickert puts it, so that it grasps one concept only

through another contrasting concept. It would understand a concept like value, therefore, only by its opposite, reality, so that it becomes impossible to explain their unity.” [1, 24] Integrating empirical reality and ontology values into an organic and logically coherent worldview is problematic in the context of pluralistic evaluation procedures. So, D. F. M. Strauss (2011) focuses on the distinction between normativity as moral and immoral. Referring to the content of the Western philosophical tradition, the author emphasizes the influence of neo-Kantian opposition of facts and values in solving the problem of normativity. In ethical projection, this problem is revealed as a verification of the autonomy and freedom of human in accordance with his conditions of existence: “However, soon, owing to the all-permeating effect of historicism, these “absolute” values were relativized and “brought down” to the level of human subjectivity and changefulness – every person has to search for his or her own values. This entailed the potential threat of having just as many “values” as there may be different persons.” [22, 212] Finally, we have a rather paradoxical situation: the diversity of procedures for verifying value, normativity and subjectivity is increasing, and the universal factors of their integration are subject to postmodern deconstruction.

A productive answer to this challenge offers the professor of University of Koblenz and Landau Rudolf Lütke (1982). He explores the emergence of the problem of the contradiction between transcendental

and empirical subjectivity. The author believes that transcendental and empirical subjectivity are philosophical distances united in the real Ego: "That term defines the ontological status of facts: Facts, in contrast to e.g., values, are independent because they are not ego-determined (ich-bestimmt). But, on the other hand, the peculiar ontological position of the subject does not allow independence in the sense of an autonomy of facts in regard to the subject. Even facts - as the ontologically most independent beings- are ego-related (ich-bezogen). Therefore, ontological status in Honigswald's philosophical system is a function of ego-relation. It is the quality of the (epistemological) relation of any specific thing to the ego that defines its ontological status." [15, 156]

However, opponents have reason to deny the unitarily of the Ego, its integrity and consistency. The most indicative in this regard should be noted in the field of practical philosophy, regulation of moral and ethical norms and conformity to ideals and values. Thus, Sergio Tenenbaum (2019) actualizes the Kantian problem of the mismatch between the norm of action and the specific purpose, that is, the contradiction between the aspirations of the individual and the normality of axiology: "While realism starts from taking for granted that the objects of our moral action are good, constitutivism seems to forge a commitment behind the back of the agent. Our constitutivist philosopher puts us in a position in which what we immediately take to have value gives

way to a norm that is not grounded on the direct object of our will." [23, 168] Thus, rationality of practical action certainly implies its ethical-axiological verification. This opinion is shared by James Kinkaid (2018), who actualizes the problem of realism of the practical philosophy of Kant, Husserl and Heidegger. The author argues that the awareness of time allows us to perceive objects as stable unities, which implies "genealogy of logic" and a priori knowledge. Accordingly, the essential and essential descriptions of intentionality attest to its universal character: "There are both internal and external horizons; the former are the hidden sides and features of the object, while the latter are the backgrounds against which an object is perceptually foregrounded." [13 9]

Probably, it would be justified to assume that the combination of subjectivity and ontology of culture and society is the key to such universality of rational and evaluative, norm and value. Vladimir N. Belov (2016) considers the most significant in the philosophical heritage of Herman Cohen the construction of such a system, which organically combines Kant's epistemology and Hegel's ontology: "They draw attention to three key interrelated principles at the heart of Cohen's philosophical system: a systematic unity of knowledge, scientism, and the independence of philosophy. The realization of these principles requires the resolution of many fundamental issues, which appear in Kant and in transcendental philosophy in general: the issue of the connection between

thinking and being (the issue of given experience and of the thing-in-itself), the issue of method (psychologism and essentialism), the issue of scientism (methodology and the hypothetical), the issue of the unity of culture (unity of consciousness), and many others.” [2, 398] This combination reveals the potential for explication of ethical and axiological problems.

***Highlighting previously unsolved parts of the general problem to which the article is devoted to. Problem situation***

The Baden school is known for its categorical juxtaposition of nature and culture. So, H. J. Rickert writes: “Nature's products are something that grows freely from the earth. The products of culture are what produce a field that a person has plowed and sown. Thus, nature is considered to be all that arose by itself, was born and given its own growth. A culture is opposed to nature, because it is one created by the person who acts in accordance with his goals, or, if it already existed, consciously formed by it for the sake of its associated value ” [19, 55] Therefore, a person perceives and appreciates the world solely through the prism of cultural values.

W. Windelband shares this view that culture is growing and created by human from material given by nature. The nature of culture, in turn, is active and creative. In this aspect, there is a mutual determination: culture is the product of human creative activity, the consciousness and worldview of which is formed by culture. This procedural seclusion is an indicator of

the systematic and wholeness of culture as a phenomenon. Any localization of knowledge or activity is a "slice" in which culture is represented in its totality. This statement means that culture as a phenomenon is not collected by the sum of its components, but on the contrary, in each component, in the "removed" or schematized form the essence of culture is represented. Being in culture is a way of being involved in the value and meaning of things and phenomena. In the hierarchy of existence, values are of the highest degree, and their content forms the value judgments, motivational incentives and the principle of analogy by which rational cognition is exercised. Following the methodology of transcendentalism, the authors insist on the a priori nature of the existence of values, the content of which determines the algorithm of evaluation and definition of all objects and phenomena of the world. Therefore, knowledge is not self-contained and autonomous, but is based on an understanding of the world, an understanding of things and phenomena from the axiological perspective, the historical and social context, the specificity of particular spheres of human life. Value is universal and normative, an ideal entity other than true. As Plato's ideas do not dissolve in the eidos of particular genera and species of being, so do neo-Kantian values, shift and condition the world, but not identical with it. Rickert is categorical: "Culture is a collection of goods, and only as such can be understood"[19, 55].

Thus, if culture is a product of the realization of values by the forces of society and the individual, then history is the horizon for the evolution of societies and cultures along the ascending line of objectification of values. Outside of culture, the realization of values is impossible in reality, so culture is a unique and extraordinarily important phenomenon. And the nucleus of culture is not the objectification process itself, but its ethics and axiological content. Accordingly, logical thinking, epistemological procedures, engineering inventions and programs, systems of pedagogy and social institutions are determined by the scale and hierarchy of actualized values. Therefore, it is logical that the Baden school broadcasts the metaphysics of value at the heart of culture as its "arche" and "acme", as alpha and omega, as essence and phenomenon, as possible and valid, as cause and effect, as the purpose and result of any activity of human and community. Accordingly, if not in the context of the world of things, then undoubtedly in the space of world history the concept of value becomes crucial. And the abstraction of the transcendental nature of a priori forms of cognition and action occurs through the radicalization of the meaning and influence of value in its metaphysical meaning from W. Windelband to H. Rickert.

### ***Discussion of the problem***

Rationalism in this concept loses the features of absolutism of influence. Instead, the emotional-intuitive sense-of-value is filled with real meaning by transcendental

wholeness. But, if Windelband and Rickert were convinced that value exists autonomously and irrespective of anything, then their successor E. Lask considers the true nature of value a special kind of relation to objects and processes of the real world. The latter denies the ontology of value, irrelevant to reality. It is logical that in such a context of the problem, in the case of isolation of value from the real world, we would have no idea of the value. Therefore, the phenomenon of value is implicit in the human way of worldview and attitude. The transition from the potential to the actual to the state of being of value takes place in the context of culture. That is, culture is the force-energy-base that actualizes values to a state of defined expression.

If the potential of value is realized, the real world acquires the characteristics of regularity, orderliness and meaningfulness. This thesis does not mean the absence of its own logic of being materially embodied. But the constitution of value in the natural-material segment transforms it into a human-sized space of existence. Of course, the existence of values does not negate the universal laws of the universe. However, the value informational-semantic, the vital component of the human way of being fills the vacuum of objective laws of nature for the necessary human meaning, essence and teleological content. Consequently, the internalization of values in the consciousness and activity of human being "brings" the world into an orderly system, in which

one perceives a person as meaningful and predicted by some destiny.

The relation of the real to the value is fundamentally aporetic, their interaction is situational with respect to specific thoughts, actions and events of human life. The collision of reality and value does not affect their substantive predicaments. Accordingly, the dualism of value and reality is indispensable, its contradiction determines the movement and dynamics of human being, both individually and socially: and the historical presentation and formation of concepts is guided by common cultural values. Thus, in contrast to the philosophy of life, which regarded the phenomenon of culture as a continuation of vitality, neo-Kantianism insists on the contradictory nature and values. But if human is the product of nature, its constituent and derivative, then the values of the real world are human's creation. The conclusion is obvious: a person and his socialized activity binds to the universal unity of the universe two different poles of being. This is how the vector of world history emerges, which ensures the continuity of the transmission of cultural values.

Universal values are embodied in reality by individual consciousness, through personal feelings, actions and events. But there is this extrapolation of subjectivity in the socio-cultural space of objectification. It is natural that the concept of value correlates with the concept of integrity as a necessary precondition for the o-value of content. Therefore, the complex dialectic of the universal and unique,

social and individual, natural and cultural allows us to articulate the problem of boundaries, space mapping and time demarcation. In other words, understanding culture as a space for realizing value determines the essence, content and purpose of human life. In such a concept, transcendence is substantively framed, and transcendentals are qualitatively defined. A person of culture metaphorically finds himself in a refined space of crystallized products of creative activity, in addition ethically and axiologically invariant (because values are universal!). The annihilation of vital stimulus and needs in the space of culture is a rather radical position, which will subsequently lead to its critique and search for alternatives. Indeed, the nature of value, in addition to model and content, is attributively normative. Accordingly, it contains a powerful socialization potential, a factor of differentiation into "one's" and "others", and accordingly, significantly determines the content and course of world history. And if in the ontological key of value the reality of nature is opposed, then in the horizon of world history the priority of axiology is indisputable.

The Marburg School actualizes the problem of culture with its logical and metaphysical provisions. H. Cohen refutes the opposition of logic and ethics. For him, thinking is the product of shared knowledge, the basis of antithesis of the absolute unity of the world. The ability to perceive the world as a whole and the ability to act in accordance with its fundamental principles is a

manifestation of the intelligibility of consciousness. Accordingly, values (Good in particular) do not oppose the natural world, but produce the possibility of explaining their field of rigid determinations of objectivity. Reanimating Plato's understanding of the process of knowing the world as hypothesis, H. Cohen proposes the rationalization of freedom as the basis of culture and history. In his system of metaphysics, will is not the blind and unconscious beginning that underlies the dynamics of the world of nature and society. Will is expedient and teleologically determined: "It is not just whirling around in the whirlpool of a troubled dance, it is attracted to. The thought gives it wings. It is clever. Will is included in the creation of Being" [4, 426]. Therefore, the real driver of socio-cultural development, the author considers humanity as a unity of rational will, ethical value and nature, which transcends to the idea of good. Thus the material and the ideal, the natural and the valuable, the intelligent and the voluntary, become united in the overall dynamics of reality.

The architectonics of reality are based on mutual justifications: knowledge and truths, values and ideals, thinking and will. Therefore, for Cohen, humanity is an integral predication of human existence in its social, historical and cultural projection. It is logical that consciousness and thinking cannot be justified by the individual or generic essence of a person, their character is fundamentally transcendental. The systematic and meaningful perception of reality by consciousness is a

continuation of the fundamental principles of culture. Therefore, the author distinguishes the concept of consciousness and awareness as a psychological procedure. Consequently, awareness is a process of reflection, and consciousness is a method of reflection. G. Cohen creates not a descriptive theory of culture, but a metaphysical system of substantiation of its essence, the center and focus of which is a consciousness or subjectivity.

P. Natorp holds the same logic of research. According to him, consciousness combines the basic constants of the definition of culture: unity and diversity, which are integrated in the course of logical and conceptual activity, universal in the area of its application. The author states: "Consciousness then means not only scientific consciousness; morality and the arts are no less in the rightful domain. Therefore, it is impossible to remain in the view that consciousness is limited to mathematical and nature science. This must become a particular problem of philosophy - the interconnectedness, conflict, and coherence of the three domains of consciousness, pervading, genetically developing, and presenting in unity. This is the interest of the system - a given unity of the culture system. The system of philosophy will not come into unity unless the true unity of consciousness prevails in the solution of this problem" [17, 92].

The quantitative indicators in the coordinates of the individual and the social allow us to design the problem of a person not as pure abstraction, but to specify numerous variations of

the dialectic. Just as there is no absolute zero or absolute infinity in reality, the notions of the individual and the general are also speculative. Each subjectivity is an individual embodiment of generality and universality. Therefore, the author insists on the creative improvement of pedagogical systems as a tool for bringing consciousness and society closer to the ideal.

To understand the essence of culture in its original and innovative definitions is the concept of critical Hartmann's ontology, whose main vocation is to differentiate the rational from the irrational. Criticism of this system of ontology lies in its aporetic methodology, or antinomic way of actualizing the problematic field of research. The methodology itself is not innovative, it originates in the works of Aristotle, and apogee acquires the philosophy of I. Kant.

Hartmann aporetically distinguishes between itself and itself as a phenomenon of consciousness, noting the autonomy of being from knowledge. He is convinced that knowledge as such does not change the essence, neither the characteristics of its existence, nor the status of its existence. Otherwise, consciousness produces fantasy, immanent consciousness and ephemeral in terms of ontology. Hartman calls the attitude of consciousness to the receptive, not constitutive, so the real world is actually real. Accordingly, cognition changes not the object but the subject itself. Accordingly, the subject creates a hierarchy of being for the purpose of appropriate orientation in the world: physical, material, organic, living,

mental, and spiritual level of being. All these levels are associated with a gradual complication. Mental level is naturally associated with individual consciousness, and spiritual - with the collective experience of historical forms of culture. Each of the levels provides for the specific specificity of interaction, so the methodology of knowing different kinds of things is qualitatively different: "Every science is constantly working on its method - but not when it reflects on the method or, even more so, when it makes it the subject of research. It works faster on its method when it is fully committed to its object. Forging it forward is a constant approach, trial, error, new approach - until it is possible to take one step forward. It seeks to cope with its subject, to master it; and this struggle is at the same time the elaboration of the method. The method grows in its grounds while working on the thing. It is identical to the progress of its work. Thus, it creates itself a method beyond the reflection of it. It does not know about him when he creates it; and she it does not need to know about it as long as it is in the real work." [19, 64] This is especially true of the "historical cultural sciences" in H. Rickert's definition.

N. Hartmann seeks to give metaphysics an existential dimension, reorienting its content from pan-logical principles and principles to knowledge and assertion of value. Values are at the heart of one or another human activity, the realization of acts of freedom and the creation of objects of culture. Values do not fall within the limits of rational cognition,

they are revealed in a certain interested grasp, emotionally-meaningful. In this context, metaphysics itself is part of a spiritual culture whose methodology accumulates the value-meaning content of the individual sciences. There are elements in the world of things that are insoluble in the cognitive objectification process. They have a different nature and traditionally refer to the eternal mysteries of human existence: life, consciousness, soul, spirit, freedom, eternity. But in one way or another the individual already knows about these concepts, has an idea and personal opinion about them. Therefore, knowing the world for human is always a spiritual act, an act of being a spiritual culture. After all, the thinker distinguishes two modes of existence of being: the existence of "here-being" (Dasein) and qualitatively defined "so-being" (Sosein). The connection in this phenomenological process of perception of the world is provided by the sphere of values, the sphere of culture.

"Here-Being" is the horizon of existence of real things, events, people and objects, which is governed by time and individuation (originality). So-being, or the ideal being of the entities, has the attributive predicates of eternity and immutability. A simple conception of being perfect is mathematical concepts or universal values. The ontological status of value is absolute and irrelevant to being real: "Values do not come from either things (or real relationships) or the subject. Neither realism nor

subjectivism are inherent in their way of being. <...> The human sense of value is the manifestation of the existence of values in the subject, and it is their peculiar, ideal being. ... Values are the essence." [7, 178]. Thus, values determine the system of coordinates of explication of the human essence and project all possible variations of activity. In other words, through the freedom of thought and human activity, the ideal existence of values is projected in the culture of the embodied world.

Particularly noteworthy is his interpretation of the importance of individuality in culture. Hartmann does not deny the objective nature of culture, but without individual subjectivity its existence is impossible. If mathematical entities are the "ideal structure" and project the "universal pattern" of being nature, then the existence of values is in no way dependent on the real world. Real things either correspond to values (wertvoll) or do not correspond (wertwidrig), but do not cause an impact on a value that is "free ideality". And in this irrelevance of value to the real world lies its disadvantage and advantage. Based on the above, nature requires mathematical abstractions, but does not require axiological ones. Therefore, the real world does not have the attributive quality of spiritual value. However, the lack of practical, pragmatic expediency in the phenomenon of value attests to its autonomous and substantive nature. The justification of being of value in the value itself, and not in related objects or processes. The culture in

such an ontology is objectification, the "materialization" of being of value.

Value is the meaning of being, the statement of its essence as content and purpose. The value through culture "deduces" a thing from the indifference of existence into a structured space of meaningful being. But Hartman understands culture as a personalized thing, its being possible only in the person-carrier, not in artifacts and organizations. Man is able to determine the meaning of his being, not based on the abstraction of number and measure, but on the supernatural values of goodness, beauty and justice. Thus, the individual creates axiological determination that is impossible for other life forms. Hartmann insists on a fundamental difference in the content of the concepts of "subject" and "personality". The subject is indifferent in value, and the personality in its life is governed by axiological factors.

Thus, the philosophy of culture as a separate field of research arises on the basis of the juxtaposition of nature and value. But if life is of indisputable value, does the confrontation between these two philosophical directions change? Of course, not. Too different ideological and metaphysical bases make up their content. However, such "paradigmatic" clashes in the study of a particular phenomenon, even as universal as culture, produce principled and significant positions in the understanding of its nature. Therefore, the basic tenets and philosophies of life and neo-Kantianism at present look axiomatic.

### *Conclusions*

1. Nature, empirical reality exists objectively and independently of human subjectivity. Its essence, purpose, existence and normality of teleology are autonomous and implicitly determined. Culture, however, is the space of realization of the ideal of value, which determines the meaning of purpose and normativity of human existence.

2. Nature, by definition of the Neo-Kantian philosophy, is the material from which and in which culture implements transcendental meanings.

3. The product of the realization of epistemological inquiries, knowledge as the foundation of subjectivity, is the embodiment of normativity, legitimized by the transcendental nature of value.

4. Value as normativity through the explication of the potential of culture organizes the chaotic world of empirical given into a hierarchical structure of the space of human being.

5. The culture's deterministic marking of the embodied world is the key and the basis of the unity and stability of subjectivity, its self-identity and uniqueness in the universal field of cultural values and the diversity of empirical experience.

6. Culture as a horizon of established patterns of interaction between human and the world changes not so much the surrounding reality as the content and the predicaments of subjectivity. And in this vein, it becomes necessary to justify the definition of subjectivity as a memory of experience. It is in this interpretation that theory and practice,

value and norm, the ideal and the harmonized in the uniqueness of objectivity of human being are existence.

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#### **Анотація**

**Актуальність цього дослідження.** Аналіз проблеми суб'єктивності в контексті діалектики цінності та нормативності є одним із фундаментальних у сучасному філософському дискурсі. Неокантіанський трансцендентальний метод ефективний у дослідженні різниці суб'єктивності та свідомості як різних способів персоніфікації ідеалів та цінностей культури. Діалектика концепцій плюралістичного емпіричного досвіду та ієрархія значущої діяльності в контексті унікальності суб'єктивності та об'єктивізації свідомості є важливою задачею сучасного гуманітарного дослідження. **Мета дослідження** - визначити вплив цінності та нормативності на процес становлення суб'єктності. **Завданням дослідження є:** на прикладі неокантової філософії розкрити твердження про значення цінності як нормативної основи існування, що надає їй характер трансцендентності. **Результати дослідження.** За визначенням неокантіанської філософії природа є тим матеріалом, з якого і в якому культура реалізує трансцендентні значення. Продуктом реалізації гносеологічних запитів, знання як основи суб'єктивності, є втіленням нормативності, узаконеної трансцендентальною природою цінності. Цінність як нормативність через пояснення потенціалу культури організовує хаотичний світ емпіричного даного в ієрархічну структуру простору людського існування. Детермінованістю культури, нормативність є ключем та основою єдності та стабільності суб'єктивності, її самоідентичності та унікальності у загальнолюдському полі культурних цінностей та різноманітності емпіричного досвіду. Культура як горизонт сталих зразків взаємодії між людиною та світом змінює не стільки навколишню дійсність, скільки зміст та специфіку суб'єктивності. І в цьому ключі стає необхідним обґрунтувати визначення суб'єктивності як пам'яті про досвід. Саме в такому тлумаченні теорія і практика, цінність і норма, ідеал і об'єктивність людини гармонізуються в унікальності існування. **Практична цінність дослідження:** стимулює наукові дискусії про зв'язки між цінністю та нормативністю як суттю підстав суб'єктивності у філософії культури, розширює можливості інтерпретації явищ суб'єктності.

**Ключові слова:** суб'єктивність, цінність, нормативність, культура, метод трансцендентного аналізу.

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### *Аннотация*

**Актуальность данного исследования.** Анализ проблемы субъективности в контексте диалектики ценности и нормативности является одним из фундаментальных в современном философском дискурсе. Неокантианский трансцендентальный метод эффективен в исследовании разницы субъективности и сознания как разных способов персонификации идеалов и ценностей культуры. Диалектика концепций плюралистического эмпирического опыта и иерархия значимой деятельности в контексте уникальности субъективности и объективизации сознания является важной задачей современного гуманитарного исследования. **Цель исследования** - определить влияние ценности и нормативности на процесс становления субъектности. **Задачей исследования является:** на примере неокантианской философии раскрыть утверждение о значении ценности как нормативной основы существования, которая придает ей характер трансцендентности. **Результаты исследования.** По определению неокантианской философии, природа является тем материалом, из которого и в котором культура реализует трансцендентные значения. Продуктом реализации гносеологических запросов, знания как основы субъективности, является воплощением нормативности, узаконенной трансцендентальной природой ценности. Ценность как нормативность через объяснение потенциала культуры организует хаотический мир эмпирического данного в иерархическую структуру пространства человеческого существования. Детерминированная содержанием культуры, нормативность является ключом и основой единства и стабильности субъективности, ее самоидентичности и уникальности в общечеловеческом поле культурных ценностей и разнообразия эмпирического опыта. Культура как горизонт постоянных образцов взаимодействия между человеком и миром меняет не столько окружающую действительность, сколько содержание и специфику субъективности. И в этом ключе становится необходимым обосновать определение субъективности как памяти об опыте. Именно в таком толковании теория и практика, ценность и норма, идеал и объективность человека гармонизируются в уникальности существования. **Практическая ценность исследования:** стимулирует научные дискуссии о связи между ценностью и нормативностью как сути оснований субъективности в философии культуры, расширяет возможности интерпретации явлений субъектности.

**Ключевые слова:** субъективность, ценность, нормативность, культура, метод трансцендентного анализа.

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